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The Forlí Conference on liberalization and democratization was a stimulating 
exchange of ideas. For three days, twenty people from Europe, United States, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe debated nine excellent papers on the concept of 
democracy, markets and the state, the processes of democratization and the 
introduction of market-oriented reforms, most of them rather theoretical but 
nonetheless well informed about in present realities. 
All of us learned a lot in this conference, and my first inclination was to 
underline what was consensual: what we learned rather than what I learned. A near 
consensus was achieved, for instance, on a very crucial point: the liberalization of 
the economy and the consolidation of democracy are only possible where the state 
and the civil society are strong. The strength of the state depends on its legitimacy, 
on the government representativeness within the state, and on the support that both 
the state and the government derive from civil society. The strength of civil society 
depends on the existence of a well-structured market system and on the balance of 
powers and the cohesiveness of the multiple groups and associations forming it. 
I could go on developing these ideas, but since I am as much attracted as I 
am doubtful about consensus, I would rather say what I learned over and above the 
broad accord we reached: that a weak state, financially bankrupted and politically 
deprived of support from civil society, as it is common both in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, is unable to create or regulate markets and is ill-suited to guarantee 
market-oriented reforms, just as much as a weak civil society is inconsistent with 
representative democracy. 
An inner contradiction befuddles the recent processes of transition to 
democracy in those two regions and the present hope for the consolidation of new 
democracies. The transitions to democracy took place in the middle of a deep and 
double crisis - a fiscal crisis of the state related to the debt burden and a crisis of the 
developmentalist and protectionist pattern of state intervention. This double crisis 
helped produced the transition to democracy, but subsequently undermined the new 
democratic governments, as they proved themselves unable to effectively recover 





democratization process and a reason behind the failure of the new democracies to 
consolidate. Furthermore, a strong but lean state, i.e., an effective although reduced 
state apparatus, is necessary to the consolidation of democracy: to guarantee 
property rights and contracts, to stabilize the economy, to promote income 
distribution and welfare, to liberalize and privatize, and even to assure the existence 
of a strong civil society. The question, then, is to know how is it possible to 
perform all these tasks within an ideological context where market-oriented reforms 
are identified with the withdrawal of the state from any economic role, where 
economic liberalization is assumed to aim at a minimum state, and within a 
practical context where privatizations are frequently so wild, stabilizations so costly 
and reforms so inefficient. Since privatization has been wild in Argentina, the 
social cost of adjustment very high in Venezuela and Chile, and stabilization very 
incompetent in Brazil, since reforms often proved inefficient and destructive of the 
existing productive system in Eastern Europe, one can ask: are these attempts at 
reforms consistent both with the their effective implementation and with the 
consolidation of democracy? 
For many years, economists have debated how to stabilize, to achieve fiscal 
discipline and the solvency of the state, to promote market-oriented reforms, 
economic growth and income distribution. In Washington, something like a 
consensus was achieved in late 1980s - the "Washington consensus". It corresponds 
do a conservative, neo-liberal paradigm. Although it was John Williamson who 
coined this expression, the actual neo-liberal consensus should be distinguished 
from Williamson's (1992) careful own definition of the consensus he is identified 
with (he adopts a neo-classical rather than a neo-liberal approach). Besides, it 
becomes clear that this "consensus" is far from being consensual in Washington or 
anywhere. In the Forlí conference it surely was not. Today it is generally agreed 
that the state has grown too much, that fiscal discipline, trade liberalization and 
privatization are necessary. But the consensus ends here. Paul Streeten, is his paper, 
showed that "for the proper work of markets, strong and in many cases expanded, 
state intervention (of the right kind, in the right areas) is necessary. It is possible to 
favour a strong state with a limited agenda" (1992: 1). Besides, Williamson 
underlined the need of de-ideologizing the role of the state in modern economies. 
And properly observed: "the fundamental political divide (on economic issues) is 
not between capitalism and socialism, or between free markets and state 
intervention, but between those concerned to promote an equitable income 
distribution (`the left') and those concerned to defend established privileges (`the 
right')" (1992: 5). 
Peter Gourevitch's paper (1992) defined four possible theories relating 
markets and democracy (1: markets require democracy; 2: markets require 
authoritarianism; 3: democracy requires markets; 4: democracy requires centralized 
planning and public ownership). Yet, even if the last theory is broadly discarded for 
obvious lack of support in reality, the consistence of the other theories with the 





with democracy is the "big bang" approach being urged upon and used in Eastern 
Europe? Moreover, as reforms according to the "big bang" approach cancel the 
state's economic coordinating role where there is no market to replace it, is it 
realistic to suppose that markets will be spontaneously created and the democracy 
consolidated, while the state is destroyed rather than reformed? 
The historical phase in which the creation of markets and the consolidation 
of capitalism required an authoritarian state is over for most countries in the world. 
This was the phase of primitive accumulation, where the basic stock of capital of a 
nation was formed, where saving roughly increased from 5 to 15 per cent of GDP. 
In the history of capitalism this was the mercantilist phase, that in most of Europe 
took place in the eighteenth century, and in Latin America and Asia happened a 
century later. The recent experiences of technobureaucratic authoritarianism in 
Eastern Europe (communism) and Latin America (bureaucratic developmentalism) 
represented an artificial lengthening of the process of primitive capital 
accumulation, a strategy to boost heavy industrialization that, only for some time, 
was able to successfully promote heavy industrialization. 
In the industrialized countries, a similar but milder process of increasing 
state intervention took place from the beginning of the century and particularly 
since the 1930s. This process was quite successful up to the end of the 1960s. Yet, 
in the early 1970, the crisis of this mode of state intervention broke up. This crisis 
was flagged by the ending of the gold convertibility of the dollar and by the first oil 
shock. It was defined by a general slow-down of the world economy. But its inner 
cause was the fiscal crisis of the state, originated from a distorted cyclical growth.
1
  
In the industrialized countries the immediate response to the fiscal crisis was 
fiscal adjustment. As a consequence, the crisis - except in the U.S. and in Italy - 
was overcome or circumvented. The growth rates declined to half of what they 
were during the post-war 25 years but remained positive. Latin American and the 
Eastern European countries did not follow the example. For about 10 years they 
were able to postpone adjustment, supported by abundant foreign finance. The 
result was an enormous foreign debt, a much worse fiscal crisis, the rise of inflation 
changed into hyperinflation in several cases, and the urgent need for deep market-
oriented reforms. 
Yet, if the inner nature of the crisis is just one and if the experience of the 
industrialized countries is to be taken into account, - rather than to adopt the 
neoliberal rhetoric, it is necessary to underline that in these countries the state was 
not destroyed or weakened, but strengthened. Thus, the same should be done in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. In East and South-East Asia the crises itself 
                                              
1 - See Bresser Pereira (1988). In this paper I suggest that the present process of 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, i.e., the reduction of the state, as well 
as the conservative, neo-liberal wave that comes with it, are part of a cyclical 





was avoided because the state remained strong whereas the economy turned highly 
competitive, market- oriented. 
The political scientists, who, in the last years, concentrated their interest in 
stabilization programs and economic reforms, initially assumed that the economists 
knew how to design them. Thus, they did not take into account that economic 
reforms could be costly, inefficient and even ineffective, if they ignored the current 
economic conditions existing in Latin America or Eastern European countries
2
.  
Economists, policy-makers, businessmen and political scientists in the First 
World are convinced that the only reason why stabilization programs and market-
oriented economic reforms do not work is political. Populist politicians, radical 
union leaders, corporatist bureaucrats and shortsighted or covetous businessmen in 
developing countries would impede the success of reforms. In believing so they 
ignore that after World War II those countries experienced high rates of growth 
counting on the same human assets; that in developed countries politicians, 
workers, middle class bureaucrats and businessmen may have a stronger sense of 
citizenship but are not essentially different; that in Latin America the direct cause 
of the present 12-year old crisis was not populism but the unconsidered 
developmentalism of the military regimes that Washington authorities supported 
politically and First World banks financed.  
This view that blames politics for all evils is now changing among political 
scientists as they see that many reforms with strong initial political support fail. 
And also as they perceive this approach is very dangerous to the consolidation of 
democracy, even having obviously some foundation. If it is the resistance of 
politicians that block reforms, the "logical" solution is to close Congress, is to 
restore authoritarian regimes, as Fujimori, an elected president now turned dictator, 
has just done in Peru. Furthermore, if it is acknowledged that there are political 
resistances, but also poorly designed economic reforms, it will be wiser to give 
equal weight to the tasks of surmounting political obstacles and defining efficient 
reforms that stabilize and ensure the resumption of growth at acceptable or 
justifiable costs. 
Populism has re-emerged in Latin America and nationalism is resurging in 
Eastern Europe as a direct consequence of the democratization process. As the 
economic crisis was not resolved but deepened, the first democratic governments 
after the transition were subject to increasing loss of support. Meanwhile, the debt 
crisis, transformed into a fiscal crisis as the foreign debt was transferred to the state, 
was not satisfactorily managed. The burden of fiscal adjustment fell almost 
exclusively on the debtor countries. Some countries, like Mexico, were able to 
impose the sacrifices on their people while competently stabilizing the economy 
and introducing reforms. Other like Chile, less competently stabilized (the costs 
were extremely high), but were effective in the design and implementation of 
                                              





structural reforms. Most countries initially failed to stabilize and reform. As the 
crisis deepened, hyperinflation exploded. This was particularly the case of Bolivia, 
Peru, Argentina and Brazil in Latin America - countries whose experience 
Kaufman and Haggard (1992) analyse. Some years after the democratic transition, 
when new presidents are elected in the middle of severe hyperinflation, they adopt 
shock market-oriented reforms, liberalizing, sometimes wildly, their economies. 
Kaufman and Haggard ask "how is that democratic governments could 
launch such comprehensive and orthodox program?" (1991: 26). International 
pressures (the Washington consensus) may be a cause, but the real reason for these 
liberal shocks - that contrast with the gradualist character of reforms in Chile and 
Mexico -, is the depth of the state crisis. When the state is fiscally collapsed, when 
it is immobilized by economic chaos, when " de facto privatization" is the radical 
and disorderly reduction of the fiscal capacity of the state rather than the result of a 
rational policy (as it happened in Peru)
3
, when "the state is dying" (as declared 
Bolivia's president Paz Estensoro in 1985), when the net costs of adjustment are 
smaller than muddling-through the crisis,
4
 when the economy is on the verge of or 
has already fallen into economic chaos, there is no alternative for a new 
government but to adopt radical - and often irrational - liberal measures.  
Yet, the exercise of extensive executive powers in the midst of economic 
crisis, that Haggard and Kaufman aptly analyse, can have a longer-term 
explanation. In a new paper O'Donnell (1992) deepens the concept of "delegative 
democracy" he has been developing in the last two years
5
. He reminds us that 
representative democracy is based on a strong state, that should not be equated only 
with the bureaucratic apparatus: "the state is also (besides a bureaucratic apparatus), 
and no less primarily, that aspect of social relations that establishes a certain order" 
(1992: 2). It is "the effect of a legality". In representative democracy "the equality 
guarantied to all members of the nation in terms of citizenship is crucial not only to 
the exercise of the political rights entailed by the workings of political democracy, 
but also to the "effectiveness of the individual and associational guarantees" (1992: 
                                              
3 - Richard Webb, in the "Prologue" to Sachs and Paredes' book on Peru writes: 
"The most striking result of Peru's fifteen-year economic crisis has been de facto 
privatization. The public sector has undergone massive compression. The state is 
withering away, and surprisingly the process has been independent of any political 
program... The shrinking preceded conservatism... The state is shrinking despite the 
politicians, the bureaucrats, and the broad preferences of the Peruvian polity." 
(1992: 1) 
4 - For the concept of net transitional costs, see Bresser Pereira (1992). Net 
transitional costs are transitional costs, the costs of adjusting and reforming, less the 
costs of muddling through the crisis. As the crisis deepens, net transitional costs 
tend to lower. 





4), i.e., to the existence of a strong civil society. And O'Donnell adds: "One of the 
contemporary tragedies is that, in most newly democratized countries, 
privatizations and other forms of de-statization are undertaking jointly - and 
unnecessarily - with a sharp weakening of the state. Nothing illustrates better the 
dominance of neo-conservative ideas than the almost indiscriminate evilness 
presently attributed to the state. The carriers of these ideas, in interplay with a deep 
socio-economic crisis, are not only reducing the size of the state: they are 
destroying the state" (1992: 6). 
Laurence Whitehead contrasts the belief existing in consolidated 
democracies that both representative governments and price stability are ends-in-
themselves, to Latin American general view that "will attach a higher priority to the 
reduction of gross inequalities or the breaking of supposed `bottle-necks' to 
development, than to absolute price stability or the more polished refinements of 
`formal' democracy" (1992: 19). And he adds: "both democratic consolidation and 
economic liberalization rest on a common foundation: the manufacture of 
stabilizing expectations. Fiscal crisis may abruptly lower expectations, and thus 
create a moment of opportunity for this to be done" (1992: 25). In fact, expectations 
are much lower today in Latin America and Eastern Europe. This is certainly 
helping the introduction of economic reforms, but if they are not economically 
efficient, politically realistic, and do not have expressly in mind to preserve rather 
than to destroy the state, these two regions are headed for many economic and 
political troubles. 
There is no doubt that stabilization and market-oriented reforms are a priority 
in Latin America as well as in Eastern Europe. The question, however, is whether 
these objectives are to be achieved in inefficient, unnecessarily expensive ways: 
destroying, rather than strengthening, the state; fragmenting rather than assuring 
cohesiveness to civil society; excluding from the agenda the resumption of growth; 
and leaving free monopolistic "market" forces which only increase economic 
inequalities. As Whitehead warns, the possible positive effect of lowered 
expectations "will fade over time unless the resulting patterns of economic and 
political behaviour can be underpinned and reinforced by a new framework of more 
effective and credible liberal institutions" (1992: 25). 
As Hawthorn's paper stressed "there may, as Constant suggested, be an 
affinity between free commerce and a representative democracy. But as Hume and 
Smith had insisted, remembering Hobbes, this can only be realized if there is a 
sovereign authority to guarantee secure and civil liberty... Indeed, Zaire, India and 
Venezuela show how liberalization can actually undermine the preconditions for 
democratization that liberal theory suggests as its natural corollary. The demand 
now is that economies open themselves to investment from outside, and that they 
retain control over their currencies and their non-economic policies only in so far as 
both are compatible with the free flow of money and goods. It is, in effect, the 





And he concludes, based on the quoted authors and on the American Federalists, 
that nothing can be achieved without a strong state, a sovereign state. 
If this is so, the neo-liberal strategy - because it weakens the state and 
ignores that the strength of civil society is not opposed to a stronger state - may 
eventually be harmful both to market-oriented reforms and democracy. The facto 
that democracy is not consolidated in Latin America and Eastern Europe was 
dramatically confirmed one day later by Fujimori's coup in Peru. Liberalization will 
help the consolidation of democracy only if it is not achieved by destroying the 
state instead of reforming it.  
The neo-liberal views prevailing in Washington propose to fight high, 
inertial inflation in gradual and orthodox terms, using just conventional fiscal and 
monetary policy, and to privatize and liberalize abruptly, according to the "big-
bang" strategy. Such course makes very little sense. The inverse - to frontally attack 
high inflation while imposing fiscal discipline, and to privatize and liberalize 
gradually while the market institutions are created by civil society and regulated by 
the state - is a more sensible alternative. Macroeconomic problems, such as 
stabilization and balance of payments adjustment, are to be dealt with in a different 
manner from microeconomic ones, as the property system and the efficient 
allocation of resources. The state and the market are strengthened when fiscal 
discipline and price stabilization are achieved in the short-run; they are weakened 
when wild privatization and shock liberalization are attempted where market 
institutions are poorly defined or non-existent.  
International competitiveness and the elimination of protectionism is an 
essentially desirable reform and must be firmly secured, but trade liberalization 
should not be so radical and abrupt as to mean the destruction of local industry. 
Neither should it be implemented if the local exchange rate is overvalued, given an 
immoderate flow of international resources. This danger, that seemed remote in the 
1980s is now present, not because the debt crisis has been solved but because it has 
not. While in the developed countries the interest rate is now very low, in the 
highly indebted countries, including Mexico, interest rates remain extremely high, 
demonstrating that the crisis is still present, and, at the same time, perversely 
attracting international capitals and mistakenly signaling prosperity. Today hot 
money finance in the developing countries has many similarities to junk bond 
finance in the developed nations. 
The day after the Forlí Conference, the Italian newspaper La Repubblica 
published an editorial from which I believe opportune to translate a paragraph: 
"What remains from the state in Sicily, in Calabria, in many quarters of Napoli, in 
the Vesuvian region, in South Puglia? A conglomerate of ruins: infiltrated 
municipal and regional councils, impotent and abandoned public prosecutors, 
intimidated Justice Courts, disorganized police, fraudulent public contracts, 
terrorized and divided businessmen and a river of drugs that flows by millions of 





state in an industrialized, European Community country. If the "evaporation of the 
public dimension of the nation-state", to use O'Donnell's expression, can take place 
in a country like Italy, just imagine what can happen or is already happening in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe where stagnation and high rates of inflation are 
indiscriminately fought with inefficient or incompetent policies.  
There is an implicit assumption in the neo-liberal consensus that the 
alternative to it is populism and/or nationalism. In fact, there is a more pragmatic or 
social-democratic alternative, that has similar immediate objectives - the solvency 
of the state and the introduction of market-oriented reforms - but that preserves the 
role of the state, asserts its social and economic roles, and underlies its function as a 
principle of legality and sovereignty. The critique of the neo-liberal approach and 
the draft of this alternative was the central concern of a study that Maravall, 
Przeworski and I recently completed on economic reforms in new democracies 
(1992). In the Forlí Conference the same theme was the object of privileged 
reflection and conceptualization: democratization and liberalization are precarious 
in the context of a weak state and a weaker civil society. 
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